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The paper attempts to explain the failure of postcommunist traders exemplified by Balkan 
traders to make use of arbitration courts by means of the rational choice of forum approach 
offered by the law and economics movement. Conjectures about traders’ behaviour derived by 
combining this approach with the constraints set by institutional features of Balkan countries, 
in particular Bulgaria and Croatia, are confronted with experience. As it turns out the 
successes yielded by the rational choice of forum approach are very limited. This may be a 
dissapointment to its most fervent advocates, but is nevertheless useful, because it suggests a 
more flexible approach. 
 
JEL classification:  K19, K41, P37 
Key words:    arbitration awards, court congestion, favoritism, appeals process,  








„Warum sind die Dienste postkommunistischer Schiedsgerichte kaum gefragt? 
Eine ökonomische Analyse.“ 
 
In dem Aufsatz wird der Versuch unternommen, die geringe Neigung der Kaufleute der 
postkommunistischen Länder, ihre Streitigkeiten durch Schiedsgerichte entscheiden zu lassen, 
mit Hilfe eines theoretischen Instrumentariums zu erklären, das der ökonomischen Analyse 
des Rechts entstammt. Diese hat sich mit der Frage befasst, unter welchen Umständen 
Konfliktparteien ein bestimmtes Forum für die Konfliktaustragung gegenüber anderen 
vorziehen. Die Anwendung dieser Ansätze auf die institutionellen Gegebenheiten bestimmter 
Balkanländer, insbesondere Bulgarien und Kroatien, führt zu Hypothesen, die einer 
empirischen Überprüfung zugänglich sind, dabei aber nicht sonderlich gut abschneiden. 
Dieses Ergebnis legt eine Erweiterung des Forschungsansatzes nahe. 
 
JEL-Klassifikation:  K19, K41, P37 
Schlagworte:    Schiedsspruch, Verfahrensdauer, Parteilichkeit, Berufungsverfahren, 
   Rechtsfortbildung 
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1. Introduction 
 
Contrary to a wide-spread view private action has been the predominating mode of law 
enforcement throughout most of human history. Pervasive government involvement in law 
enforcement is a rather recent phenomenon. Moreover, private lawmaking has played a 
significant role for the development of the European merchant classes.  It is well known that 
for several centuries lex mercatoria developed mostly outside the sphere of public legislation 
and law enforcement, it was enforced by private courts, reputational concerns and ostracism
1. 
These private (or semiprivate
2) courts were the historical predecessors of modern arbitration 
courts. The adoption of the rules of lex mercatoria by state courts was a gradual process 
which extended over a long time. In England it started in the fourteenth century but was 
completed only in the nineteenth century. Merchants who failed to comply with the rulings of 
merchant courts found themselves cut off from valuable business opportunities because 
honorable traders often learned about their misbehaviour and refused to deal with them. 
Arbitration has been a wide-spread means of dispute settlement even though in most nations it 
was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that arbitral awards started to be 
enforced by state courts
3. English and American state courts often were hostile towards 
arbitration. It was only in the early nineteenth century, a time of increasing court congestion, 
that they discontinued a long-standing practice of voiding arbitration clauses. As Benson 
(1990, p. 224f., 1995, p. 481f.) notes this hostile attitude certainly hampered the development 
of arbitration but failed to drive it out of the market. This was because reputational concerns 
were a powerful disciplinary devise which provided for a role of arbitration even after the 
fading and abolishment of guilds made it more difficult to organize a boycott.  
Contrasting this historical account with postcommunist experience, as for example 
Southeastern European experience, several differences appear as striking
4. Arbitration courts 
do exist in most of Southeastern Europe but they are used infrequently. In Bulgaria, in which 
arbitration is more popular than in most other Balkan countries, the available data published 
by the two largest arbitration institutions suggest that the number of disputes settled by 
arbitration has so far been in the range of only a few hundred per year. In Romania activity 
seems to be in a similar range. The leading Romanian arbitration institution reported 351 
                                                           
1 On the enforcement of lex mercatoria see Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994). 
2 „Semiprivate“ was maybe more appropriate if the court was located in a city which was effectively ruled by a  
merchants’ guild. 
3 See Benson (1995). 
4 In Eastern Europe and the CIS matters are not much different. 
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awards in 2004
5. This is a multiple of the arbitral awards  recorded e.g. in Croatia or in some 
East Central European countries like e.g. Slovakia. The average number of arbitration awards 
rendered by the key arbitration institution in Croatia was only ten per year in between 1992 
and 1999
6. Nevertheless Croatia claims to be the leader in the region. If region means 
“Western Balkan” this may be true. Comparing these figures with the overall number of 
commercial disputes abjudicated by state courts it is obvious that the market share of 
arbitration has been less than one percent. Clearly arbitration has been of minor relevance 
even though in most if not all of Southeastern Europe arbitration awards are enforced by state 
courts. To be sure, enforcement by state courts is not worth much, their enforcement 
machinery is weak and tedious. However, in most Western countries arbitration awards were 
not enforced by government at all until the second half of the nineteenth century, but 
arbitration worked nevertheless and was widely used. In contrast to Western countries, the 
Southeastern European disregard for arbitration tribunals is not due to the superior quality of 
the services provided by their major competitors, the state courts. Elsewhere, e.g. comparing 
Germany and the USA, the market share of arbitration appears to be strongly contingent on 
the price and quality of the services provided by state courts. In Germany arbitration is much 
less popular than in the USA
7; at least part of this difference may be due to the fact that 
German state courts abjudicate commercial suits more quickly than courts in numerous US 
states and that the costs which litigants need to bear tend to be lower in Germany as well. 
However, the services of Balkan judiciaries are for sure much worse than those of all US  
judiciaries, the slowness, unreliability and inefficiency of Balkan state courts is common 
knowledge. Historically as well as in the present, such deficiencies have often stimulated the 
growth of arbitration, but in post-communism this has so far failed to happen. Thus we are 
faced with a puzzle.  
The paper explores only those potential resolutions for this puzzle which are in the 
realm of rational choice analysis. There may be other reasons as well, disregard for arbitration 
may be rooted e.g. in the attitudes, beliefs or prevailing self-image of the emerging class of 
traders but the paper will not try to analyze them. After confronting conjectures derived from 
rational choice analysis with experience, the paper stops with concluding that alternative  
                                                           
5 These data are found on the internet pages of the respective Bulgarian and Romanian institutions. 
6 See Uzelac (1999, p. 67). Because this court does not publish any data observers depend on occasional reports 
by Croatian scholars. 
7 For some data indicating the limited relevance of arbitration in Germany see Lachmann (2002, p. 30). 
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“sociological” approaches deserve to be taken seriously. The latter have been occasionally 
mentioned in the literature, e.g. in his discussion of postcommunist arbitration already Triva 
(1991, p. 24, translation by B.S.) stressed that socialism fostered  a culture of irresponsibility 
and dishonesty and proposed that this explains disinterest in arbitration. “Those compatriots 
of us who have been appointed as managers of companies continue to believe strongly that 
adroitness in outsmarting and overcharging one’s businesspartners is the key to success. This 
conviction is reinforced by the continuous experience that they are not held responsible for 
their misbehaviour...”
8. In Triva’s view a predisposition to dishonesty implies that 
businessmen care little about fair and lawful dispute resolution and cultivating trust. In the 
rest of this paper this “sociological” view of the lacking demand for arbitration services will 
be referred to as the Triva-conjecture.  For the student of Eastern European economic history 
the Triva-conjecture has a familiar ring. Historical examples suggest that the attitudes 
emphasized by Triva do not always lend themselves to rapid change. E.g. Pipes (1990, p. 205) 
reports that the Russian merchant class abandoned its traditional “Levantine” traits only 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, much later than the Russian nobility
9.   
Most of the attempts at resolving the puzzle which are discussed in the paper are in the 
spirit of the standard economic analysis of judicial systems pioneered by Posner (2003) and 
Shavell (1995a, b). As so often in the economic analysis of law the basic ideas have been 




2.   Attempts at Resolving the Puzzle 
2.1  Lack of Knowledge 
 
It has been suggested that few traders are aware of the opportunities offered by arbitration 
courts
10. During communism arbitration proper did not exist except in foreign trade, it was 
outlawed, although its reintroduction was advocated occasionally, this occured e.g. in 
Bulgaria
11 and in Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia some courts purporting to offer arbitration 
services for domestic disputes actually were set up in the sixties, but effectively they 
remained, as Dika (1999, p. 36) put it, “parastatal” until the disintegration of the Communist 
                                                           
8 For an early analysis of how Yugoslav socialism promoted such attitudes see e.g. Lydall (1986 ).  
9 He traces these “Levantine” traits to the insecurity of  property rights. It was only in the eighteenth century, that 
government started to respect merchant’s property rights, up to then they “had to conceal their wealth” (op. cit. 
p. 217).  
10 See e.g. Dika (1998).  
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Party in the late eighties. According to some sources, the arbitration court of Zagreb in actual 
fact may have been sort of an exception because the Communist Party rarely or never took an 
influence on its decisions. However, it had not much to decide. Anywhere else arbitration 
proper was a new and  unfamiliar concept in postcommunism
12. The requirement that traders 
need to have proper knowledge about arbitration because in the absence of this knowledge 
dispute resolution by arbitration cannot acquire much relevance, is more demanding than it 
may seem. This is because arbitration tends to be used primarily if it is considered already in 
the very moment in which traders conclude a contract. The contract needs to contain an 
arbitration clause and this arbitration clause must fulfill certain requirements to be valid and 
effective, e.g. it needs to specify a workable procedure for the selection of an arbiter. 
Thinking about arbitration later, after the conclusion of the contract, is likely to be too late. If 
the dispute has already arisen one side to the dispute often is unready to agree to arbitration 
because it expects to be the loser. As a result it will usually prefer state courts, because state 
courts are slow and dragging matters out often appears as desirable to the likely loser. So, 
arbitration will play a real role only if considerable numbers of traders have become used to 
pondering about potential legal controversies at the very moment in which they are soliciting 
business. In the early nineties this sort of legal thinking presumably was far from their mind. 
However, it is less obvious that fifteen years later those whose business survived have not yet 
learnt from experience. And simply assuming persistence of plain ignorance over more than a 
decade is certainly not in line with the beliefs held by theorists who think of private enterprise 
as a creature which tends to adjust quickly to all new circumstances and opportunities offered.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 See e.g. Brajkov (1976).  
12 Communist governments installed various sorts of allegedly non-governmental tribunals, among them were 
the sudi udruženog rada (courts of united labor) in Yugoslavia or the drugarskite sădilišta (comrade courts) in 
Bulgaria. After 1974 Yugoslav arbitration courts were conceived as a subspecies of sudi udruženog rada. These 
tribunals were directed by the communist party and were dubbed nongovernmental only because of  the fiction 
that the communist party was not part of government. In actual fact the party instead was at the very heart of 
government. These tribunals thus do not disprove the proposition, that under communism law was thought of as 
the exclusive domain of government and the communist party. For an analysis see e.g. Bender and Falk (1999). 
The proposition that the Zagreb arbitration court actually was rather independent is due to Uzelac (1998). 
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2.2   The Shortage of Lawyers and of Adequate Legal Advice 
 
The missing explanation or at least part of it may be supplied by the shortage of lawyers resp. 
the shortage of sufficiently competent lawyers
13.  In most Balkan countries except Yugoslavia 
the number of law students and jurists was sharply reduced under communist rule. As a result  
early postcommunism featured a huge excess demand for lawyers. Unfamiliar concepts like 
arbitration are likely to be advertised by lawyers to the extent necessary to make them popular 
only if they need to solicit additional business. If lawyers become too numerous to earn their 
living by representing their clients in state courts they tend to react by diversification, they 
expand into consulting and open up other lines of business which create additional demand 
for their services, among these other lines is dispute resolution by arbitration. As soon as this 
occurs knowledge about arbitration is likely to become more widely disseminated
14.  
However, doubts remain whether this is really the decisive factor which explains the 
slow spread of  arbitration in the postcommunist Balkans. Most of  post-Yugoslavia has not 
suffered from a shortage of lawyers. Nevertheless, arbitration courts have not become popular 
in post-Yugoslav countries either. A variant of the argument just presented might be thought 
of as solving the puzzle. While in purely quantitative terms post-Yugoslavia does not feature 
an excess demand for lawyers, in terms of quality it does. As Triva (2001, p. 30) indicates 
these quality deficiencies have been remarkably persistent.  Post-Yugoslav countries continue 
to suffer from a shortage of competent lawyers in whom traders are ready to trust. If clients 
tend to distrust their lawyers, arbitration may be inferior to litigation. In state courts a decision 
can be appealed against, in arbitration it cannot. If somebody litigates at a state court and his 
lawyer turns out to be incompetent or unreliable, he can exchange him after his first failure 
and go to the appellate court, i.e. he effectively has a second chance. In arbitration the first try 
usually is the last. This conjecture may appear as plausible until we come to realize that in 
some post-Yugoslav countries, in particular in Serbia, a substantial number of entrepreneurs 
and top-managers do have a legal education themselves and thus may be expected to be 
sufficiently competent to make an informed choice of their lawyer
15.   
 
                                                           
13 For this argument see e.g. Triva (1991, p. 20). 
14 However, notice that the historical development of merchant law did not depend on lawyers. In those times 
merchants were rarely represented by lawyers. 
15 See Ekonomist magazin 259, 5.5.2005, p. 24 which reports that Serbian top managers usually have university 
degrees, mostly either in economics or law.  
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2.3 Distrust  in  Arbiters 
 
It is a well-known fact that on the Balkan penninsula arbitration tribunals often are distrusted.  
However, state courts are distrusted as well. Distrust is due to two reasons. Traders perceive 
courts as potentially biased and as incompetent. It turns out as useful to distinguish two kinds 
incompetence, factual incompetence and legal incompetence. Factual incompetence concerns 
the lack of ability of the court to recognize and appreciate the facts which are relevant for the 
case and resist attempts of litigants to stir confusion. Legal competence concerns the ability of 
the court to apply the law correctly to the facts i.e., to dispense justice.  
The major reason to perceive courts as prone to favoritism is the suspicion that they 
might be influenced by bribes, connections or political pressure. In real life this is a major 
reason to avoid courts altogether, but it is less obvious that it affects the division of the 
dispute resolution market between arbitration courts and state courts. It may seem that distrust 
should reduce the market share of arbitration only if arbiters were distrusted more than state 
courts judges. However, there is no indication that this holds in any of the Southeastern 
European countries. Most of these countries have several arbitration courts, thus, litigants 
have a choice and may select arbiters who appear as comparatively trustworthy. If none of 
them is trustworthy they may opt for ad hoc arbitration i.e. the arbitration clause may specify 
a procedure to select a particular trustworthy person and appoint it as arbiter for the particular 
dispute in question. It is worth noting that arbiters are likely to be less susceptible to political 
pressure than judges at state courts
16. Arbiters often are wealthy and reputable lawyers who as 
a result of their private wealth may be less dependent on politicians than judges. Judges at 
state courts are badly salaried and in many respects dependent both on the chairmen of their 
courts and the bureaucrats who are in charge of managing the judiciary. These bureaucrats 
often pursue a political agenda and entertain a broad variety of connections.  
Thus, if favoritism is the concern, arbitration appears to come out ahead of state 
courts
17. Nevertheless, even though the possibility to choose an arbiter has value, it fails to 
provide a complete solution to the problem of bias. In Balkan countries clientelistic networks 
are perceived as pervasive, as a result one can never be quite sure who is involved with 
whom.  
 
                                                           
16 Balkan judiciaries differ substantially with regard to the independence from political pressure which they 
enjoy. Bulgarian and Croatian courts are rather independent, while Albania, Crno Gore and Serbia mark the 
opposite end of the spectrum. These differences will be neglected in this paper.  
17 This issue is reconsidered in the next section. 
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  If the small market share of arbitration in the dispute resolution market does not seem 
explainable by perceived favoritism, how about perceived incompetence ? Perceived 
incompetence presumably is the predominant reason why all sorts of legal dispute resolution 
mechanisms are distrusted. Under communism the legal professions were downgraded, except 
prosecutors legal professionals had little prestige. They were thought of as low-grade 
academics, similar to economists, and much inferior to engineers, who were viewed as the 
elite group
18. Such misperceptions of legal professionals and the resulting distrust are 
reinforced by the deficiencies of academic legal education which often has changed only  to a 
minor extent. Moreover, perceived incompetence of courts is also nurtured by the rarity of 
lateral entry into the judiciary. Young legal professionals tend to have a poor understanding of  
business matters. When they age and mature their understanding improves, they learn by 
experience and they need to if they practice as commercial lawyers. If instead they enter a 
judicial career at young age as is so typical for the career judiciaries found in Southeastern 
Europe, this process of maturing may be slowed down.  
Does perceived incompetence affect the market share of arbitration ? Arbiters usually 
are reputable and experienced lawyers, viewing them as incompetent is a bit farfetched. To be 
sure, if arbitration courts would become busy they would need to delegate much of their 
workload to young unexperienced lawyers for the plain reason that experienced lawyers are in 
short supply, but so far this has not occured yet. Moreover, in arbitration traders are able to 
select the arbiter and are thus in a position to make sure that he is a competent person. In state 
courts litigants cannot influence the allocation of cases to judges, at least not by legal means. 
In summary, it seems that concerns about competence should drive up the market share of 
arbitration rather than reduce it. 
 
                                                           
18 This perception also was held in Yugoslavia. On this see e.g. Triva (1991, p. 23). Really it always was 
inadequate, from his personal East German experience the author of this paper is under the impression that most 
of the legal professionals educated under the communist regime were by far not as stupid as engineers believe, 
the superiority of engineers was more a matter of arrogance than a reality. However, the perception was there 
and it still exerts quite an impact. 
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2.4  The Missing Appeals Process 
 
One potential reason why the missing appeals process may hamper the development of 
arbitration has already been noted in section 1.2.. In arbitration usually there is no right to 
appeal except if certain major failures like violating basic principles of due process or ordre 
publique have occured. If this happens the arbitral award may be appealed at a state court. Of 
course, as a matter of principle, traders willing to choose arbitration can decide differently. If 
they wish to have an appeals option statute law often
19 does not hinder them from providing 
for it. All they need to do is specifying the arbitration clause accordingly. 
A first reason offered in the literature
20 why arbitration clauses rarely provide for an 
appeals process is that arbiters are usually selected for their expertise. This renders error less 
likely than in state courts and, consequently, reduces the value of the appeals process. This 
value largely depends on the need to correct for errors made at the first instance and on the 
ability of the appellate court to identify and correct them. For more on the latter see infra. 
Second, it is argued that arbiters have strong incentives to avoid error because error 
may damage their reputation and thus their ability to attract future business. As a result, the 
likelihood of error at the arbitration court is further reduced. Once more the argument applies 
that the lower the likelihood of error at the first instance the less the need for and the utility of 
an appeals process.  However, notice that this reputation mechanism depends on prerequisites 
which cannot be taken for granted in postcommunism. In particular, it presumes that 
disputants resp. their lawyers are capable of recognizing error. If it is not properly recognized 
commiting an error is less likely to impair the arbiter’s reputation and he has less of a reason 
to avoid it. In postcommunism, legal (as opposed to factual) error often is difficult to 
recognize because the law is not sufficiently clear. As Shavell (1995, p. 413) put it the 
concept of legal error is “clear when the law is well articulated ... otherwise error is not a 
well-defined concept.“ Postcommunist law often is obscure, this obscurity is, to quite some 
extent, due to the fact that much of it is new law. Hamilton (1788 as quoted in Voigt 2003 p. 
33) put it succinctly: “All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and 
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and abjudications.”  To make matters worse, postcommunist law often fails to be 
“penned with the greatest technical skill”. As Landes and Posner (1979) observed, arbitration 
                                                           
19 E.g. the Croatian arbitration statute offers this opportunity. 
20 See e.g. Shavell (1995a). 
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occurs mostly in fields in which legal error is largely irrelevant, because the law is clear
21. A 
reason for this presumably is that in the absence of a well-articulated law the reputation 
mechanism is less efficient in disciplining arbiters and it may even fail to work altogether
22. 
Third, an appeals process is less useful in arbitration because it is more difficult and 
costly  to recognize and correct error. This is because in many countries arbitration courts do 
not issue opinions and because their procedure often is rather informal and relies heavily on 
the expertise of the arbiter. As a result a reviewer, in particular a reviewer who does not share 
the particular expertise of the arbiter, may find it difficult to spot an error when reading the 
records of the tribunals’ proceedings and he may have to engage in an extensive 
reconsideration and additional fact finding. This renders the appeals process more costly and 
makes error at the appellate court more likely, reducing the value of the appeals process. Of 
course, arbiters often write down some reasons for their decisions but the purpose of this 
document is making their decision more acceptable to the disputants
23. The disputants usually 
are not concerned about the substantive legal questions which their dispute raises, and as a 
consequence arbiters do not see a need to discuss them. In accordance with this conjecture 
Bernstein’s (1992 p. 127, 150) study of arbitration in the diamond industry finds that “in 
complex cases ... it is difficult to determine what substantive rules of decisions are applied” 
and that, as a result, “in complex cases ... diamond industry arbitration suffers from the same 
weakness as most commercial arbitration: unpredictability.”
24 As Landes and Posner (1979) 
point out issuing an opinion proper which exposes the substantive rules underlying the 
decision and presents a well articulated legal argument is like producing a public good. If 
published, this opinion renders utility to various nonparticipants and even to the public at 
large. They can learn from it about the legal problems which the dispute raised, and how these 
problems may be resolved, it thus contributes to development of law. Unless they are required 
to, for-profits such as arbitration courts are unready to produce public goods except if they 
                                                           
21 This claim may be somewhat overstated. As the historical lex mercatoria demonstrates arbitration has not 
always been unfit for lawmaking. Sometimes contemporary arbitration courts engage in  precedence production 
as well, as it seems this is relevant mostly for courts established by trade associations of certain industries. E.g. 
in the Netherlands most disputes relating to construction works are decided by an arbitration court established by 
the trade association of the construction industry. This court produces precedents on a substantial  scale, many of 
its opinions are published. The same happens in quite a number of other Dutch industries. The presumable 
reason for this behaviour  is that the relevant trade associations chose to require it.  For more on this see 
Blankenburg (1995).  
22 Evidence for this proposition may be found in Western arbitration systems as well. Bernstein (1992, p. 127) 
reports about the arbitrators of the diamond trade association, that „many traders feel that the arbitrators have 
redistributive instincts; they cite the unpredictability of the decisions as well as the arbitrations’ tendency ‘to 
split the difference‘ as an important motivation to settle their disputes on their own.“ This is because the rules of 
decision applied are less than clear, in particular „there are no general rules of damages.“ 
23 In some countries like e.g. Germany arbiters are required to issue sort of an opinion, but the standards applied 
to its quality are much less exacting than at state courts.  See e.g. Lachmann (2002, p. 347).   
24 Bernstein is not alone in making such claims, see e.g. Lachmann (2002, p. 52). 
   10
happen to be joint products of their core activities, whose production does not cause 
substantial additional costs. However, it does. Writing a high-quality opinion is a time-
consuming task which most jurists tend to dislike
25. In addition, postcommunist judges and 
arbiters are not used to writing sensible opinions, it tends to be a difficult job for them, their 
writings frequently are of very mediocre quality and more often than not fail to spell out a 
perceptable legal argument
26. In most post-communist countries law schools do not prepare 
their students for this aspect of their future jobs
27.  Thus, jurists usually write opinions only if 
they are required as they are in state courts. There are a few exceptions to this rule, e.g. some 
Bulgarian arbiters write and publish opinions, presumably in order to advertise their 
outstanding level of competence
28. While this marketing strategy may be effective, it is also 
very costly, cheaper alternatives are often available. Thus, opinion-writing it is not likely to 
become popular among arbiters
29.  As Bernstein (1992, p. 150) points out, another reason why 
arbiters often do not issue (high-quality) opinions is the disputant’s desire for rapid dispute 
resolution. Informality and reliance on the arbiter’s intuitive understanding render the 
procedure less time-consuming.   
In view of these obstacles against a meaningful review of arbitral awards an alternative 
technology to reduce the likelihood of error is superior, this is decision by a panel of arbiters 
rather than by a single arbiter. This argument has been made rigorous by Shavell (1995a) who 
compares the appeals process with decision by panel, he conceptualizes them as alternative 
technologies of error avoidance. He demonstrates that the appeals process is superior to a no-
appeal decision by panel only if  the decision of the first instance lends itself to a meaningful 
review
30.    
In summary an appeals process for arbitral awards makes less sense than an appeals 
process for state court decisions. However, forgoing the option of an appeals process may 
seem like a reason to avoid arbitration if litigants, although maybe mistakenly, tend to 
                                                           
25 As is evidenced by the observation that when American judges became busy writing opinions was one of the 
first tasks which they delegated to their law clerks. German judges and arbiters are no different. While in 
German state courts judges are effectively required to write their opinions themselves, in arbitration opinion-
writing is often delegated to employees of the arbiter. See Lachmann (2002, p. 693). 
26 For illuminating insights on this see Schröder (2003). 
27 Exams tend to be taken orally, law students are rarely required to solve a case in a written exam. Law students 
do not discuss actual cases in class, legal education still boils down to memorizing statutes.   
28 The Bulgarian law journal Tŭrgovsko pravo regularly features a column Arbitražna praktika which contains 
excerpts of opinions written at one of the two major Bulgarian arbitration courts.   
29 It might be thought that this problem can be circumvented by a contractual requirement on arbiters to imitate 
the procedure of state courts including opinion writing. This drives up the costs of arbitration, are traders really 
ready to pay for that ? Moreover, who is going to decide whether the arbiter has really fulfilled this requirement 
and how will nonfulfillment be sanctioned ?  
30 Intuitively, his argument may be represented as follows: If appeals courts frequently reverse correct decisions 
which is the likely outcome if a meaningful review is difficult, correct decions often go to appeal. As a result the 
appeals process is costly and wasteful.  
   11
perceive this option as valuable.  The available data on appeal rates may lead one to believe 
that they indeed do. It is well-known that in most Balkan countries, and similarly in East 
Central Europe, an amazing number of court decisions goes to appeal, appeal rates are 
enormous by any standards
31. An option which is very widely used presumably has value. 
However, at closer inspection this inference turns out as dubious. A straightforward 
counterargument is, that appeal may be attractive only for the losing party because it delays 
matters. The higher the appeals rate the longer the court queue at appellate courts, appeals 
may amount to mere foot dragging. This abuse of the appeals process for dilatory tactics is no 
doubt common, and unfortunately it is often facilitated by procedural law which in some 
Balkan countries allows litigants to reveal evidence only at the appellate court, even though 
they could have presented it just as well at the trial court.  Foot-dragging may be particularly 
attractive if the defendant can engage in fraudulent conveyance or expects to be judgement 
proof by the time when the plaintiff has got a final judgement and can initiate enforcement. 
This is not all a rare occurence. Uzelac (1999, p. 67) proposes that dilatory tactics are 
employed even if they are not rational and characterizes the prevailing behaviour of Croatian 
litigants as follows: “... a litigation practice between domestic subjects, in which the process is 
dragged out as long as possible and the enforcement is delayed by exhausting each and every 
legal means regardless of chances for success.” This implies, that the abuse of the appeals 
process for dilatory tactics should render arbitration more attractive for honest traders. 
Signing an arbitration clause means forgoing an option to employ such tactics. As a 
consequence, refusal to sign an arbitration clause may be perceived as a valuable signal 
disclosing information about the true intentions of a potential business partner. If the potential 
partner does not have the serious intention to discharge his contractual duties faithfully he will 
be hesitant to sign an arbitration clause which deprives him of some opportunities to muster 
dilatory tactics to protect himself from being held responsible. Thus, the abuse of the appeals 
process should make arbitration more popular among honest and rational traders. This is 
however not what we really observe. So, the issue remains: is there a countervailing force 
which dominates this proarbitration effect ?   
As Shavell (1995a) stresses, a crucial function of appellate courts is error correction. 
Another one, of course, is lawmaking, clarifying and amplifying the law
32. Arguably this 
legislative function is their key contribution to social welfare. Since this is about producing a 
                                                           
31 While in the Balkans we have to rely on estimates, in East Central Europe real statistical data are available. 
E.g. in the Czech republic some 40 per cent of all judgements go to appeal. See Návrhy (2004). For some 
estimates on the share of appeals in Bulgaria see Judicial (2003). 
32 The very high appeal rates found in postcommunist nations are actually a hindrance to a proper discharge of 
these legislative tasks because it creates an excessive workload which tends to debase the quality of the output. 
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public good, most litigants care little about this sideproduct of their activities. Instead a 
litigant cares about judicial errors but only if they are to his disfavor. In Shavell‘s model error 
is conceptualized as an event whose likelihood depends on the amount of time which a judge 
devotes to deciding a dispute. Devoting more time reduces the error rate. Note that this 
conception of error is inappropriate for modelling the impact of favoritism. The analysis of 
favoritism involves a crucial element of strategic interaction. The appeals process may 
dampen the influence of favoritism on judicial outcome because trial court judges whose 
decisions indicate blatant favoritism run the risk that this is recognized by the appellate court 
and that this may e.g. reduce their promotion possibilities. The error-likelihood function 
proposed by Shavell is not relevant for the „errors“ of a biased judge because he is not really 
in error, he knows quite well what he is doing and spending more time on the case is unlikely 
to change his decision. 
Since favoritism is so important in the Balkan, our analysis will distinguish between 
the sort of error which Shavell models and errors caused by favoritism. Shavell-type errors are 
considered first. As will be shown these errors cannot explain the preference for dispute 
resolution mechanisms offering an appeals option which we observe in the Balkan penninsula. 
The appeals process creates value both for society and for litigants if it reduces the rate 
of judicial error and if the benefit of this reduction outweighs the additional costs generated 
by the appeals process. This requires that a mistaken judgement is considerably more likely to 
be reversed at the appellate court than a correct judgement. If an appeals process is available it 
however may also be used if this condition is not met. The social usefulness of the appeals 
process is enhanced if litigants are frequently able to recognize trial court error. In contrast if 
litigants are mostly unable to distinguish correct and erronous trial court decisions they often 
will appeal even against correct trial court decisions. The inability of litigants to distinguish 
correct and erronous decisions results in a flood of appeals which generate costs, but no social 
value. Moreover, if the probability that a correct decision is reversed on appeal is relatively 
high, the loser in the trial court may go to appeal even he realizes that the decision of the trial 
court was correct. These appeals are undesirable as well. 
At this point the distinction between the two types of errors introduced in the last 
section comes in handy. Appellate courts have only limited abilities to correct factual errors. 
In particular, they do not have the resources nor  the time to engage in lengthy factfinding. 
Consequently, factfinding at the appellate court often is unlikely to generate value for society. 
For obvious reasons the party who lost at the first instance nevertheless often wants to engage 
in additional fact-finding. Except under rather special circumstances this should be curbed. 
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Matters are different with legal errors. Trial courts surely commit large numbers of legal 
errors. Appellate courts typically have superior legal competence, and are thus likely to 
correct legal errors. This tends to create social value. The likelihood of legal error is high 
because, as was noted above, much postcommunist law is new law and thus obscure. 
However, for the very same reason litigants often find it difficult to distinguish erronous and 
correct decisions. This drives up the (expected) costs and hence reduces the value of the 
appeals process for society and similarly for traders who are in the process of negotiating a 
contract and consider including an arbitration clause and have thus not yet entered a dispute, a  
situation which will be referred to as ex ante.  Judicial overload at the appellate courts also 
drives up the error rate at the appellate courts, this similarly reduces the ex ante value of the 
appeals option.  
These drawbacks are significant, but presumably not sufficient for definite conclusions 
about the ex ante value of the appeals process. Two additional considerations however allow 
for more definite results. This is: Going to appeal may eliminate a legal error, but this is ex 
ante desirable for traders only if correct is tantamount to efficiency-enhancing. And second, 
the ability of arbiters to come to a correct decision resembles that of trial courts rather than 
that of appellate courts. Neither of these two conditions is actually satisfied.  
Ex ante, before the dispute arises, rational traders care about efficiency in the Kaldor-
Hicks-sense posited in the law and economics literature. I.e., ex ante traders prefer that 
potential disputes are resolved in a way which maximizes the expected value of their business 
relationship.  Ex post, after the dispute has arisen, they often do not care about this, but the ex 
ante view is relevant for the decision to sign an arbitration clause. Posner (2003) argues at 
great length that the key doctrines of common law are roughly in line with this efficiency 
requirement and seems inclined to extend this claim to Roman law as well. To the extent that 
the basics of Southeast European substantive civil and commercial law rest in Roman law it 
may be in accordance with efficiency, but the actual interpretation of this law by appellate 
courts often is not
33. Consequently, it is conceivable that the judgements of arbitration courts 
outcompete state courts by being more in line with the efficiency requirement than the rulings 
of appellate courts. This would be greatly facilitated if  Southern European arbitration statutes 
were to provide traders with a choice of substantive law. Then they could choose a law which 
is more in line with the efficiency requirement. Unfortunately, even the most liberal 
arbitration statute of the region, the Croatian one, bars such a choice of law except if 
                                                           
33 An obvious example of deviation from the efficiency requirement is the tendency of postcommunist courts to 
underestimate damages. 
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foreigners are among the disputants
34. In this regard Southeastern European arbitration 
statutes are notably less liberal than e.g. German arbitration law or the resp. laws of 
Anglosaxon countries.  The Croatian statute, however, allows traders to opt for a decision ex 
aequo et bono. The precise meaning of this phrase has never been clarified, according to a 
prominent Croatian arbiter serving at the Zagreb arbitration court it simply means that the 
arbiter has to respect the basics of Croatian law but may disregard the details
35. As a matter of 
principle, this provides arbiters with some leeway to make efficiency-enhancing decisions and 
thus an opportunity to outcompete state courts. Even in countries which as a matter of 
principle do not allow decision ex aequo et bono arbiters in actual fact have such 
opportunities as well because the case law of appellate courts often lacks coherence and 
because arbiters are not required to reveal the substantive rules underlying their decision. 
Triva (1991, p. 19, translation by B.S.) put it like this: “Even in countries whose statute law 
disallows rulings ex aequo et bono arbiters can nevertheless do it, this is in particular ... 
because they are not required to rationalize their decisions which effectively renders a judicial 
review ... impossible.”
36  
Concerning the second consideration, arbitration courts similarly may achieve 
superiority.  As was argued already in section 1.3., it is not difficult to find an arbiter who is 
less likely to commit a legal error than the run-of-the-mill state court judge for the simple 
reason that the latter often are underspecialized and required to handle a broad variety of 
cases. 
To sum up, the unpopularity of arbitration is not explainable by the ability of appellate 
courts to correct for legal error. Thus, if the missing appeals process is a major obstacle to the 
development of arbitration this must be due to another reason. The only remaining candidate 
is the ability of appellate courts to curb favoritism at the trial court. Above it was argued that 
in postcommunism the reputation mechanism fails to discipline arbiters to a sufficient extent, 
and thus offers no adequate substitute for supervision. Consequently, the ability of appellate 
courts to curb favoritism may be an advantage of state courts. Presumably, this holds in 
particular, if the following four conditions are met: First, favoritism is perceived as 
widespread. This clearly holds in the Balkan penninsula. Second, favoritism is at least among 
jurists considered as sort of an evil, although maybe a necessary evil. If this condition is not 
                                                           
34 The same holds for Bulgarian law which otherwise is fairly liberal as well. See Stalev (2001, p. 673).   
35 See Sikirić (1995, p. 130). 
36 At least Germany, text books on arbitration law typically warn against authorizing arbiters to rule ex aequo et 
bono arguing that such decisions are nearly totally unpredictable. See e. g. Schütze (1998, p. 95). To be sure, 
invoking a well articulated and efficiency enhancing law is a superior choice. However, since Southeastern 
European traders are not allowed to do that  the uncertainty involved in ex aequo et bono may be a minor evil 
compared to the inefficiencies caused by the case law of state courts.   
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fulfilled appellate court judges are unlikely to sanction trial court favoritism. However, it 
seems to be fulfilled by and large. Third, a trial court judge whose behaviour reveals blunt 
favoritism can be punished for that in some way. It is not necessary that the punishment is 
immediate or sure, already a nonnegligible likelihood of some disadvantage imposed on him 
sometimes in the future should suffice to curb favoritism somewhat.  
Fourth, favoritism is not due to political pressure which equally hits trial courts and 
appellate courts. Obviously if the appellate court is exposed to the same political pressure and 
equally likely to yield to it, the appeals process is useless. If favoritism is however due to 
reasons other than such political pressure, the appeals process may provide for a curb on 
favoritism at the trial courts even if appellate judges are similarly prone to favoritism. This 
holds if appellate court bias is uncorrelated or only weakly correlated with trial court bias.  
Appellate court bias may be expected to be largely uncorrelated with trial court bias if 
relevant connections typically are not connections to formal institutions but connections with 
individuals and extended families. This means that a plaintiff who manages to instrumentalize 
a connection to the trial court judge and influence him has to start from scratch and engage in 
a new connection building effort if it comes to influencing the appellate court judge except in 
the unlikely case that the latter and the former are members of the same extended family or 
have roots in the same village. According to the accounts given by anthropolists
37 this 
condition appears to be met, anthropologists usually describe connections as resulting from 
networks between individuals, and thus unrelated to formal institutions except  the extended 
family. It is worth noting that anthropologists have gathered much material which suggests 
that e.g. in Bulgaria favoritism is viewed as pervasive and a necessary evil which nobody can 
avoid. As a colourful example consider the rather common practice to approach jurists with 
the request to serve as godparents when a newborn child is to be baptized. This is an effort to 
extend the extended family into a desirable direction. 
Since all of the four conditions seem to be met in quite a number of Balkan countries, 
it may be inferred that favoritism at  lower instance state courts is likely to be more effectively 
curbed than at arbitration courts. This presumably is an advantage of state courts. However, a 
possible counterargument resembling an argument presented above needs to be considered. 
Couldn’t  favoritism be curbed just as effectively by a panel system ? Arbiters can be required 
to sit in panels. According to a common argument panels make corruption more difficult. 
However, in the Balkans this often does not seem to work. Doubts about the ability of panels 
to curb favoritism may be inferred from observing appellate judges who sit in panels 
                                                           
37 see e.g. Benovska-Săbkova (2001). 
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everywhere. It seems that more often than not they endorse a policy of „mind your own 
business“ and “live and let live”, they effectively delegate the decision to one member of the 
panel and do not intervene if he displays favoritism
38. Presumably, this may occur among 
arbiters as well. In most Balkan countries there is every reason to harbor such suspicions, 
Croatia is an exception to this rule. The personalities of quite a number of arbiters working at 
the Zagreb arbitration court strongly suggests that selecting a panel which is uninclined to this 
“minding your own business”-attitude is perfectly feasible. Consequently, in Croatia the 
favoritism-curbing ability of the appeals process is unable to explain the unpopularity of 
arbitration, elsewhere it may.  
 
 
2.5 Preference  for  Secrecy 
 
Not only judicial dispute resolution but also arbitration, although to a lesser extent,  has the 
disadvantage that it may result in disclosure of facts which disputants prefer to keep secret. 
Often they have a lot to hide because the shadow economy continues to be of crucial 
relevance for their success and much business is partly conducted in the shadow. Because 
judicial dispute resolution is more likely to result in unwelcome disclosures than arbitration, 
the desire for secrecy is likely to increase the market share of arbitration in the dispute market. 
Moreover, within the market for arbitration services the desire for secrecy may be expected to 
favor ad hoc arbitration over institutional arbitration
39.  In ad hoc arbitration it is easier to 
keep secrecy. Nevertheless, secrecy is not perfect in ad hoc arbitration either, thus the desire 
for secrecy implies that the overall dispute resolution market is smaller than it were in an 
environment of transparent and openly conducted business. This is because the loser in the 
arbitration court may file a complaint at a state court. Irrespective of whether he has reason to 
complain or not,  the state court will then get access to and look at the files of arbitration, and 
this may imply that the prosecutor gets access to the files as well. So if traders want to keep 
secrecy there is some reason to beware of arbitration as well, the competitive advantage 
created by the more discreet style of arbitration is of limited relevance except if traders trust 
each other that neither will complain to a state court. The fact that we do not observe a large  
                                                           
38 See e. g. Schönfelder (2005, p. 77). 
39 Ad hoc arbitration refers to a tribunal created for the purpose of resolving a specific dispute, institutional 
arbitration refers to the dispute resolution services dispensed by an arbitration court which offers its services to a 
variety of individuals. 
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market share of ad hoc arbitration thus does not necessarily imply that the considerations of 
this section are misguided, it may rather be due to low levels of trust among traders.  
 
 
2.6 Inadequate  Execution 
 
Obviously, the value of judgements both of arbitration and state courts is seriously debased by 
weak enforcement. Different from the historical law merchant  reputational concerns 
frequently have failed to incentivize Southeastern European traders to comply with 
judgements which are not credibly supported by the coercive powers of government. This 
seems to be due to two reason. The first is the short time horizon of many businesses. The 
highly unstable political, legal and economic environment makes longterm considerations less 
relevant, it drives up discount rates. Reputational damages are mostly a long term 
consideration. Moreover, in a highly unstable environment it is very difficult to decide 
whether failure to fulfill a contract is due to forces which are beyond the control of the 
business partner or not. Thus a business partner can mask opportunism by invoking force 
majeure and it may be difficult to disprove this claim. As a result the damage which failure to 
deliver promises causes to his reputation is less severe. Fortunately, many Balkan countries 
have witnessed a gradual stabilization which has already made reputational concerns more 
relevant. Consequently, many observers have noted an improvement of business morals in 
most of postcommunist Europe. Business morals had reached an all-time low in the early 
nineties. The betterment observed since then certainly has not yet gone far enough that the 
capitalist ethos of honesty, industry and thrift has come to the fore, nevertheless, this 
improvement has been much more pronounced than what can be possibly explained by the 
typically very moderate upgrading of judicial systems. This has surprised many observers. 
This surprise in itself has revealed a shortcoming of much research in postcommunist affairs, 
namely it reveals that these observers have grossly underestimated the potential power of 
reputation-based self-enforcement mechanisms. What is relevant for the topic of this paper is 
that the increasing role of reputation-based self-enforcement mechanisms should render 
arbitration increasingly attractive as well.  Failure to comply with an arbitral award may cause 
damage to the reputation of the loser. Because the future is discounted, the shorter the time 
until this damage occurs the more powerful the threat of reputational damage, and here 
arbitration has two advantages over state courts: it tends to be considerably faster and there is 
no appeals process which drags matters out. This suggests, that the market share of arbitration 
should be on the rise because traders are no longer as short-sighted as they used to be in the 
   18





3.   Some Empirical Evidence 
 
The dearth of reliable empirical information on arbitration is often deplored in the theoretical 
literature
41. The analysis of private justice thus amounts to a fairly speculative venture 
virtually anywhere, but data about postcommunist arbitration are even poorer. To mitigate this 
problem at least somewhat, a survey was conducted among a selected group of lawyers 
practising in two major Bulgarian cities, Plovdiv and Varna. Lawyers were thought of as the 
best available source of information because it is known that on the Balkan penninsula 
arbiters usually are lawyers by profession. Moreover, in arbitration courts litigants are nearly 
always represented by lawyers
42. Lawyers are the primary and often the only source through 
which businessmen learn about arbitration. Thus, lawyers presumably are more 
knowledgeable about the obstacles hampering arbitration than any other discernible group.   
Among the reasons to select Plovdiv and Varna was that both cities are major centers 
of commerce, they have witnessed considerable economic growth in recent years, and are 
among the most prosperous places in Bulgaria and on the  Balkan penninsula. In both cities 
there is a local provider of arbitration services. Local availability of an arbitration court may 
be expected to stimulate the demand for arbitration. This is because lawyers are hesitant to 
recommend out-of- town arbiters. It is believed (and not without reason) that lawyers 
practising in the city in which the court which decides the case is located are in a better 
position to take influence on its arbiters resp. judges. Bribes and other activities undertaken to 
influence courts often are intermediated by lawyers who entertain connections to arbiters resp. 
judges. For this reason, recommending an out-of-town arbitration court may amount to losing 
clients. If a dispute arises the client is likely to prefer a lawyer practising in the town where 
the court resides because the latter is likely to have better connections.    
As was noted above, Bulgarian arbitration is well-developed by Balkan and even by 
East Central European standards. Thus, it was conjectured that among the Plovdiv and Varna 
                                                           
40 To a large extent it has occurred not via growing business at traditional institutions but by setting up new 
courts which attract some new business. This makes the expansion harder to measure. E.g. in Bulgaria 
throughout most of the nineties there existed only one arbitration court. Since the late nineties at least three more 
courts have been set up.  
41 See e.g. Uzelac (1999, p. 56). 
42 This may seem evident to the reader. However, at least historically this often has not been the case in Western 
Europe. 
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lawyers there should be more expertise for arbitration than in most other regions of the 
Balkan. However, even in Plovdiv and Varna a considerable majority of the local lawyer 
population rarely handles commercial cases and has little first-hand experience with 
arbitration. An attempt to interview all of the 1012 lawyers registered with the Plovdiv bar 
association
43 and the 967 lawyers registered with the Varna bar association thus was unlikely 
to deliver meaningful results. To solve this problem the two interviewers, who were graduated 
law students
44, took an effort to identify lawyers specialized in commercial cases and ensure 
their participation. They got hold of 90 such lawyers in Plovdiv and 70 in Varna. To ensure 
adequate participation of lawyers specializing in commercial cases the interviewers took an 
effort to visit all of them in person
45.  When they were successful, they conducted a short 
interview in the course of which  a questionaire of only nine questions was filled. As a result a 
high participation of these expert lawyers was assured
46.      
The most clearcut result of the survey is that according to a considerable majority of 
respondents at most ten per cent and most likely even less of  all commercial contracts contain 
an arbitration clause. Informally, some lawyers voiced the opinion that even in those cases in 
which an arbitration clause is included in the contract this often is not due to a conscious 
decision of participants but rather to their using a standard contract form loaded down from 
the internet or supplied by some consultant. By now, such standard forms more often than not 
contain an arbitration clause. An overwhelming majority of respondents view ignorance as the 
primary reason why businessmen fail to consider this issue, most businessmen are not aware 
of this alternative to state courts. In addition they typically fail to seek legal advice before a 
dispute arises and thus stay behind a veil of ignorance until it is too late. This indicates that 
legal illiteracy continues to be the primary reason for the slow development of arbitration.  
Compared to legal illiteracy distrust in arbiters is a much less relevant factor. It is well 
known that  all courts are distrusted but only eighteen Plovdiv respondents thought that state 
courts are more objective and less susceptible than arbitration courts. Most of the Plovdiv 
respondents thought that in this regard there is little difference between state courts and 
arbitration courts. Some of the  respondents – apparently those who had most first-hand 
experience with arbiters - were aware of arbiters’ superiority in terms of competence but this 
was not common knowledge among the surveyed lawyer population. Among the more 
                                                           
43 Not all of them practise in the city of Plovdiv, some instead practice in various smaller towns in the 
surroundings. 
44 I am grateful to Rositsa Tsvetkova and Temenuga Blagova for doing this work. 
45 Out of the 90 experts identified in Plovdiv only 15 preferred to answer the questions by mail, the others agreed 
to a personal interview. 
46 It would have been considerably more costly and difficult to implement this procedure in Sofija. This was a 
reason to prefer Plovdiv and Varna.   
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sursprising results of the survey was that at Varna distrust in arbitration was much more 
prevalent than at Plovdiv. The interviewer also learnt about the reason. As was mentioned 
above laywers recommend local arbiters. When asked about their trust in arbiters respondents 
tend to have the local arbitration court in mind. In 2002 and 2003 the Varna arbitration court 
had been attacked by the prosecutor, and as a result it was defunct during the time of the 
interviews. A defendant who had lost his case at the local arbitration court and was subjected 
to execution had complained to the prosecutor arguing that the procedure had been conducted 
in a grossly unfair way. He did not file for setting aside the arbitration award
47 even though 
Bulgarian law similar to most other countries offers this venue for disputants claiming that 
arbiters failed to grant  due process. The prosecutor initiated several criminal and civil 
procedures against the arbitration court and its arbiters arguing that they routinely (!) violated 
basic principles of due process and that the court itself was illegitimate because it had not 
been set up by “statute”. The second reason is clearly spurious because Bulgarian arbitration 
law requires no more than a civil law contract to set up an arbitration court. The prosecutor 
ordered a search of the arbitration court, this police action was widely publicized and thus 
noticed by the local legal community and others. Later the prosecutor took measures to 
suspend the arbitration court’s work. While his actions appeared as strange and of dubious 
legitimacy to the better informed observers, they did not fail to put a shadow on the arbitration 
court
48. 33 of the Varna respondents thought of arbitration courts as less reliable than state 
courts. The observation that trust in this arbitration court plummeted is suggestive of the 
shakiness of the foundations on which trust in such institutions rests.   
When asked whether they would advise their clients towards arbitration 49 of the 90 
Plovdiv respondents said yes and 40 no, in Varna only nineteen of the 70 respondents were 
ready to advise for arbitration, the other 51 would advise against it, reflecting the local crisis 
of confidence. Since among all Bulgarian arbitration courts only the Varna court has been 
involved in a “scandal” the Plovdiv results are presumably more relevant. When asked about 
the reasons to advise against the arbitration a considerable majority of Varna respondents  
                                                           
47 Instead he challenged the enforcement decision which the local state court had issued at the request of the 
judgement creditor because the judgement debtor refused to serve the award. This complaint against the 
enforcement decision however was turned down by the appellate court.  
48 It is worth noting that the criminal procedures never reached the court room, they were suspended resp. 
interrupted.  The reader may wonder about the role played by the prosecutor. This behaviour is possible only 
because Bulgaria has not yet broken away from the Soviet tradition of conceiving the prosecutor as a watchdog 
over „legality“ endowed with broad authority and a range of duties extending far beyond investigating and 
prosecuting criminal violations. This concept puts the prosecutor into competition with courts. Courts and 
prosecutors effectively have overlapping jurisdiction. 
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denied that execution of arbitration awards may be more difficult than execution of state court 
decisions, while 31 of the Plovdiv respondents thought that execution of an arbitration award 
may be more difficult than execution of a state court decisions. This suggests that concern 
about execution sometimes may be a reason to stay away from arbitration but it is not the key 
obstacle. Among both Varna and Plovdiv respondents who would advise against arbitration 
the key concern rather was that arbitration is a no appeal procedure. 42 Varna respondents  
and 34 Plovdiv respondents pointed to this. Nearly two thirds of those respondents who 
tended to advise against arbitration viewed this as the key disadvantage. The questionnaire did 
not contain a question inquiring into the reasons why the lack of an appeals process is 
considered a  disadvantage. This is actually quite in line with the theoretic analysis suggested 
above because among Bulgarian legal professionals it is well known that state courts in which 
judges sit in panels are no less venal than single judges sitting alone. Bulgarian experience 
thus leads one to believe that panels should not be regarded as an effective brake against 
favoritism. 
Information communicated informally suggests that the appellate courts are viewed 
not only as institutions of superior legal competence and thus capable of correcting legal 
error, but also as less susceptible to favoritism except in cases involving fairly high stakes. 
Appellate judges may be venal but they are not cheap. Local courts and some arbiters are 
thought of as susceptible to petty bribary. Even trifling presents such as bottle of whisky 
apparently may exert quite some impact. This seems to be much less common at appellate  
and supreme courts, there the issue is large-scale corruption. In view of common perceptions 
of corruption it is worth noting that by far not all judges are venal and that this is widely 
recognized as well
49. 
The conjecture that legal illiteracy among traders remains the key obstacle against the 
growth of arbitration is supported by some other evidence as well. As noted above traders 
may prefer ad hoc arbitration over institutional arbitration because they want discretion. Thus, 
legalizing ad hoc arbitration may be expected to stimulate the development of arbitration. In 
Croatia ad hoc arbitration between domestic traders was legalized in 2001, much later than in 
Bulgaria. However, this does not seem to have exerted much of an effect, opportunities for ad 
hoc arbitration have not been widely used. This is easy to understand if legal illiteracy 
happens to be wide-spread.  
Another factor which has not been mentioned in the above analysis but is believed to 
have an impact on the use of the arbitration is whether state courts respect arbitration clauses. 
                                                           
49 For evidence that this is common knowledge see e.g. Kapital 30 April 2005 p. 111. 
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If state courts in particular appellate courts sometimes void arbitration clauses without giving 
a convincing reason this is said to create doubts about arbitrability and discourage traders 
from using arbitration. Moreover, it is believed to keep foreign investors away because 
foreign investors typically do not want to rely on state courts. Neither Bulgaria nor Croatia 
have been fully reliable in this regard, but the Croatian record has been better
50. To be sure it 
has not been impeccable either, state courts have sometimes failed to honour arbitration 
clauses. In Bulgaria, the judiciary behaved worse and furthered doubts about arbitrability in 
1992 and 1997 when it voided arbitration clauses for reasons considered as spurious by 
authoritative observers
51. Thus, if doubts about arbitrability are a major factor influencing the 
development of arbitration, Croatia has performed better than Bulgaria. However, there is no 




4.   Epilogue 
 
The observation of widespread distrust in judges and arbiters suggests an opportunity to 
conduct a socially useful experiment which may reveal to what extent the market for 
arbitration services is depressed by perceived favouritism. There exists a straightforward way 
to solve the problem: Allow traders to use foreign arbitration courts or appoint foreigners as 
arbiters. E.g. if they contract some business allow them to insert an arbitration clause in the 
contract which refers to a specified foreign arbitration court. If perceived favouritism is the 
primary reason to avoid arbitration, legalizing such clauses should result in enough of a 
superiority of arbitration over state courts that court congestion would be considerably 
reduced and a major part of contractual disputes transferred to arbitration. Since court 
congestion is a common complaint in all of Southeastern Europe this should be welcome 
relief. Moreover, if court congestion declines, court corruption is likely to decline as well, 
since quite often bribes are primarily speed-money.   
Why do arbitration statutes of most Southeastern European countries prohibit or limit 
market access of foreign arbiters ? A plausible conjecture is that the business interests of 
                                                           
50 This holds in particular for appellate courts, less so for trial courts. In a widely noticed and fairly scandalous 
decision the Rijeka commercial court in 2002 voided an arbitration clause agreed upon between an Austrian 
investor and an influential Croatian businessman, but in 2004 its decision was reversed at the appellate court. For 
an attempt at a complete overview of earlier Croatian state court decisions concerning motions to set aside 
arbitration awards see Uzelac (1999).    
51 See Uzelac (1999) and Janevski (1998). The courts’ reasoning as reported by Janevski is simply hilarious and 
strongly suggests favoritism.  
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domestic lawyers are at stake who want to keep potential competitors out of the market, they 
want to be the exclusive providers of arbitration services. This conjecture receives some 
support from the hesitance of most Southeastern European countries to admit foreigners to the 
domestic bar. This hesistance clearly is motivated by domestic lawyers’ business interests. So, 
if these interests prevail on the bar, it is not surprising that they prevail in arbitration statutes 
as well. The prevalence of lawyers interests’ seems even more plausible if one considers that 
arbitration statutes are a highly technical legislation on which politicians are not likely to have 
strong opinions or much knowledge. They will rather leave the drafting of the statute to the 
experts i.e. to domestic lawyers. Moreover, shutting out foreign arbitration courts also may 
seem in line with a widely held desire to limit foreign influence.  
In contrast to most other Southeastern European countries Croatia conducted the 
suggested experiment and reformed its arbitration statute in 2001 to the effect that foreigners 
may now be appointed as arbiters even for domestic disputes. There is no indication that this 
has significantly increased the demand for arbitration services. That it was possible to break 
up the monopoly of domestic lawyers’ seems explainable by the fact that in Croatia academic 
jurisprudence has been comparatively developed and influential. Academic scholars are less 
inclined to protectionism than the average lawyer, they have little reason to fear foreign 
competition. The advise offered by academic jurists shaped the Croatian reform.      
The observation that even this did not cause much change is another dissapointment 
for our endeavour to rationalize the underuse of arbitration. We have rehearsed all 
conceivable rational reasons for and against arbitration, but the attempt to corroborate the 
resulting conjectures by empirical observation has largely failed. The only hypothesis which 
received a good deal of empirical support was that of plain ignorance. Unfortunately, the 
observation of continuous ignorance is difficult to reconcile with the rational choice approach 
towards information gathering favoured by economists. If businessmen fail to learn about 
such important matters for such a long time this suggests that they do not care to know about 
them in spite of their importance and that they prefer to avoid lawyers. Thus we are back to 
the Triva-conjecture.  It seems plausible that a traders class inclined to see “buyers and sellers 
.... as rivals pitted in a contest of wits”
52 is not predisposed to legal thinking. This is not to say 
that traders are all crooks, they are not and there is indication that virtues like honesty and 
reliability are increasingly valued by Balkan traders. However, traders do not tend to think 
about law as an instrument which may help them to control contract opportunism. If the word 
law comes their mind they do not tend to think of civil law, they think of tax law, building 
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ordinances, regulations of the employment relationship etc.. They often share the deep-rooted 
cynicism towards law which is wide-spread in the Balkans, such cynicism is not an attitude 
conducive to overcoming legal illiteracy. This cynicism is continously reinforced by 
governments tinkering with public law. Traders might be less distrustful of arbitration if they 
were to perceive arbitration courts as their courts and thus different from state courts. Such a 
positive perception might be forthcoming if traders would join trade association and if 
arbitration courts would be set up by these associations. However, Balkan traders have been 
slow in organizing. Associations of businessmen of whatever sort typically have few members 
and do not enjoy much support. Those which exist often represent only a small minority of the 
business community and are distrusted by the others. The slow growth of arbitration may be 
related to the delayed development of employers’ associations of all sorts which also is the 
reason for the political weakness of entrepreneurs in the Balkan penninsula. Historically, the 
development of arbitration often has been promoted by the growth of trade associations. 
Benson (1990, p. 218) notes e.g. on the reemergence of commercial arbitration in the USA at 
the end of the nineteenth century: “The main area of rapid redevelopment of commercial 
arbitration was in the trade associations.” This observation suggests that investigating into the 
reasons why Balkan traders have been slow to organize
53 might be more helpful for 
understanding the obstacles against the growth of arbitration than the rational choice of forum 
approach rehearsed in this paper.  
These conjectures have at least two further implications. First, they imply that in 
postcommunism the relation between state courts and arbitration may be different from how it 
is presented in much of the economic literature on arbitration
54. This literature tends to view 
them mostly as substitutes resp. alternatives. However, if many traders are inclined to lawless 
conduct, state courts and arbitration are more in the nature of complements. Only if state 
courts succeed in strengthening the respect for law arbitration is likely to prosper. 
Second, if ignorance is the key problem more effective advertising may  help to 
increase the demand for arbitration services to quite some extent. Since lawyers are not 
allowed to engage in agressive advertising this job would be up to the minister of justice. He 
should welcome the potential relief for a grossly overburdened judiciary. However, so far 
little has been done to advertise arbitration. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
52 Pipes (1990, p. 205). For some evidence for the continued prevalence of such attitudes see Želeva (2003, p. 
153). 
53 for some observations on that see Želeva op cit. p. 154. 
54 see e.g. Benson (2000). 
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